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n: THE SUPRE'\E coc.;q'j_' 0"' 'T1 'r-r 
- [ '.~ 
STl\TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 15915 
KENllETll SHARP I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPo:mE?lT 
STATE'1ENT OF T!-iE cJ.1\TURF. OF THF. CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of Burglary, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-E-202 (1) (1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before the Court and convicted 
as charged in the Third Judicial District Court by the 
Honorable Ste1·1art M. Hanson, Jr., presiding, who was also the 
trier of fact in this case. 
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decision. 
STAT:C:11E':T OF THE VAC':'.'S 
On NoveP1ber 22, 1977, the appellant and 2 co"lpani· 
David \'1eston .Z\llen, brol:e into a cabin owned hy ,Toseph H. 
Cornwall (R. 99). The Cornwall cabin is located at Pines 
Ranch in Summit County, Utah. 
located in the same area. 
Several ot:-ier cabin:; are alsc 
The appellant and Allen clir.bed the fencP to Pin: 
Ranch (R. 94), entered several cabins (R. 99), including~ 
Cornwall cabin, by breaking windows (R. 100), and pushi~ 
doors o~en (R. 102). Inside, the contents of dra~er:; a~ 
cunboards were emptied onto the floor (P. 60, 63). Althouc 
no items were ultimately taken from the cabins, the appelk 
and Allen moved items \·rithin the cabins (°-.. 103). nr. 
Kenneth Rogerson, a security guard for Pines Ranch, said Or 
miscellaneous items had been moved and piled near the 
entrance in each cabin (R. 62, 63). T'!e appella:-.t a:!:: Alle: 
also entered a tool shed near the Cornwall cabin and All~ 
tampered with a snowmobile in an attemot to start the rnachi: 
(R. 107, 150). 
-2-
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The ~ppellant ~as sePn wit~in the l:~undari~s of 
the; Co~r>'·1 u.l L premises l:"c Mr. Roc;erson (R. 41, ll2). Rog'.:'rsCJn 
also su.~ the appellant and Allen running east, away fro~ the 
Corm·!il 11 cabin. Rogerson overtook the two men, identified 
hims cl f as a security guard (R. 42), and told the~1 that they 
were trespassing (a. 44). 
After the appellant and Allen left the private 
pronertv in compliance with ~ogerson's demand, ~ogerson 
walked back to the Cornwall cabin. He saw that the doors to 
the shed and cabin were open and that windows in each had 
been broken (R. 44,45). He also noted that a snm·nnobile, 
belonging to the Cornwalls, had its cover off (R. 45). ~here 
were fresh footprints in the snow leading to and from the 
cabin and shed and al 1 around the snO\"Ttlobi le (R. 4 5) • 
Rogerson then followed the a1>pellant and Allen east 
up a road, watched them enter and drive off in a green 
Chevrolet pickup, followed the truck down the canyon (R. 47), 
and stonped at a service station in Oakley to call the 
:;~.eri.:f (R. t17). He gave the nolice a descri;ition o!: the t'·:o 
r«en and t:-ie vehicle, and the license nlate number of the 
vehicle (R. 47, 48). The appellant and Allen were arrested 
that same day, taken to the Coalville Sheriff's Department, 
0nd la.ter identifie>d by Rogerson as the two men he had ordered 
o~r tho orivate prooerty and had followed down the canyon 
l'c. cl'' u. tJC)). 
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back to Pines Rdnch. 
had been rarl<ed and follov;c:>d t1Jo sets of tracJ:s 10,:ic;j ng fro 
the truck (R. 56) to each home in Pines Ranch. 
Rogerson entered the Cornwall cabin with its ow~ 
Josep'1 E. Cornwall. Cornwall observed that the ca.bin had 
been entered by force (R. 47); he had not given the appelk 
or his cor;i.panion, ?c,rmission to enter the cabin (~. 15~., fr 
Again, t\10 sets of footorints were seen on the 
Cornwall Premises around the cabin and leading to the sno'1-
mobile (P.. 15')). These footprints ancl others leaving thP 
premises and leading toward the road were identified by 
Deputy Shcrir~ Wilde as being consistent with the type of 
shoes ~,rn h\ the appellant and ~llen. 
by the SUITLTT\i t County Sheriff's Office and had ha<l tbe opport: 
to observe the appellant and Allen when they were taken ~ 
Coalville (P. 127). 
As Dreviously noted, several cabins, including the 
Corm;all cabiE, were burglarized on ~Jovercber 22, 1977 (?. 9~ 
Evidence of these other break-ins was admitted at trial u~~ 
Rule 55 of the Utah R.ules of Evidence to .3hm,1 intent to cor,": 
a crime, absence of I'1istake, motive, opooctunity, and a co~,,· 
plan. (R. 153). 
-4-
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items 0round inside each cabin (~. 102-106) at Pin es Rane•~ 
with the exception of the Carfall cabin (R. 62) _ The two 
sets of fresh footiJrints in the snow 1.vere seen at every horr.e in 
the area and were the same at each location (R. 57-SS). In 
addition, all of the cabin doors had been opened and, in all 
but one cabin, drawers had been opened and their contents 
emptied onto the floor (R. 63). Miscellaneous objects such 
as tool kits, electric saws, and saddles had been nlaced near 
the doors (R. 61, 62). 
The Court stated, under Pule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, that receipt of this evidence did not create a 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusion to the 
trier of fact. Defense counsel's motion to strike the 
evidence of other criminal conduct was therefore denied (R. 158) . 
.7\RGUMENT 
POINT I. 
EVIDE"ICE THAT THE APPELL..Z;.:JT 
BURGLARIZED OTHER CABI~S I~ THE 
Pll-i:':S RANCH AREA WAS PROPERLY 
AD!HTTED A.S IT DE!1Qt;STRATED 
INTE"lT, ABSENCE OF MI STAKE, MOTIVE, 
OPPORTUNITY, AND A CO~·lMON PLAN. 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
-5-
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11 Suhjr:1ct to P1_1lc; -17 e\·.i..rlcrL:c· 1 J.Zlt-
a person corruc1ittE•c1 a criT\1'"" or ci"; 
wrong on a specified occasion, is n-
admissible to prove his disoosit;on 
to comrni t crime or civil 1,1rong as th2 
basis for an inference that he cn~-
mi tted ar.otl-ier crime oo:- civil vrcntcr 
on another specified occasion but, 
subject t0 Rule 45 and 48, such evic1~::1ce 
is admissible 11hen relevant to nrove 
sowe ot.'1ermaterial fact includin<J absc-w::e 
of mist:akr~ or accident, motive, oppoj:tli::1if:y, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or~--
identity." (Emphasis added) -
See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232, (Utah 1975). 
This general principle of evidence was explain~ 
this Court in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 
772 (1969): 
"Concededly, evidence of other co:-ines 
is not admissible if the purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil 
character with a nropensity to commit crime 
and thus likely to have crnn.rnmi tted the crh1e 
charged. However, if the evidence has 
relevancy to exolain the circumstances sur-
rounding the instant crime, it is admissible 
for that purpose; and the fact that it may 
tend to connect the defendant with another 
crime will not render it incompetent." (Id. 
at 775). 
Appellant contends that evide::1ce of other crinin; 
conduct was admitted at trial to show his bad character. 
However, the purpose of such evidence was made clear to the 
Court by Mr. Christiansen, the prosecuting attorney: 
-6-
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"~/cur Hano!"", if I cc.n resnond 
to that. Rule 55 indicates that 
evidence of a person committing 
another crime is aamissible where 
such evidence is relevant to prove 
a material fact including absence 
a [sic] mistake or absent [sic] 
motive or opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
I would submit to the Court that the ~ 
evidence Mr. Rogerson is about to 
testify to goes specifically to intent 
and to plan and to motive. And I 
would also cite to the Court the case 
of State v. ~ibson, a 1977 case, 
found at 565 P.2d 783, where the 
evidence of a rape was admissible in 
a murder trial under Rule 55 on two 
bases: number one, that it showed 
possible motive for killing; number 
two, it was part of the total picture. 
I would also cite to the Court 
the case of State v. Demeer, found at 
Utah 2d 107, a 1944 case. In that 
particular case the defendant was 
charged with assault with a deadly 
weap6n upon a prison guard while 
attempting an escape. The trial court 
let into evidence testimony concerning 
a gunfight with the Salt Lake City 
police that occurred just subsequent 
to the escape. On appeal it was 
argued that this evidence was in-
admissible inasmuch as the assault 
had already taken place. The 
Supreme Court ruled the evidence 
admissible, and sPecificallv stated 
a party cannot, by multiplying his 
crime, diminish the volume of 
competent testimony against hil"'I." (R. 49, 50). 
-7-
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court. 
"Your l-ionrn:, this evir1ence i:; 
relev=~t to show t~at the defendant 
intcnc'2d to corTu-itit a theft, anCI bv 
shn~in~ the fact that other cabin~ 
were broken into and what Mr. Rogerson 
observe(! in those cabins, directly 
rel:ites to that intent." (R. 51) 
Rule 55 has been consistently followed by ttis 
In State v. Jones, Utah, Case No. 15705 (Septemb~ 
1978), this Court upheld a heroin sale conviction and ruled 
that testiomony of previous purc'nases of the druq fror'. the 
appellant was properly admitted. 
Again, in State v. Van Dyke, Utah, Case No. 1568; 
(December 28, 1978), Rule 55 was aonlied to admit evidence 
of other bad acts of the defendant to establish a plan a~ 
motive for the robbery in question. This court held that 
evidence that the defendant "had been hitting a few rinky-
dink places" "was relevant to the issues of intent, plan, 
preparation, and knowledge". 
Similarly, evidence that the ao~ellant entered 
other cabins at Pines Ranch tends to show a common olan or 
scheme. Testiroony that items inside the cabins were oil~ 
near each door demonstrates a plan and preparation to stgl 
the items, and intent to commit a theft, as requii:ed for 
conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-G-202(1) (19=,3 as 
amended) is thereby established. 
-8-
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abuc;,;, 1 the di sere ti on granted in Rule 115 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidcrice b? -Failing to orooerlv balancs the probci.tive worth 
and the prejudicial effect of the evidence. This court, in 
State v. Lopez, ~, noted that "such harm as there may be 
in receiving evidence concerning another crime is to be 
weighed against the necessity of full inquiry into the facts 
relating to the issues." Aopellant suggests that a "necessity 
test" be adopted wherein the court evaluates the necessity 
of evidence of other crimes and limits its admission to the 
n.isnutec-1 issues. In the instant case, intent was in issue 
(R. 51). Thus, even under the "necessity test" recorruuended 
by the appellant, evidence of the other cabin break-ins was 
properly admitted as it was relevant to show that the 
appellant intended to commit a theft (R. 51). 
Respondent submits that the lower Court did not 
err in its application of Rule 45. Rule 45 provides: 
"Excent as in these rules 
otherwise provided, the judge may 
in his dis;retion exclude evidence 
if he finds that its orobative 
value is substantially outweighed by 
the ris~ that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumntion of 
time, or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury, or (c) unfairly and 
harmfullv surprise a party who has 
not had ~easo~able onportunit~ to 
u.nticioate that :C'.lC~l eviCl.ence would 
be offercCl. 
-9-
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,-=._1- :_ ..:.t 
appellant's intelligent waiver o~ jury (~. 3~-3F), 2 nd 
the judge was alreaclv aµ~re of the evidence (~. 52). In 
addition, the juage had a clear understandin~ that t~e 
purpose for admittjng such evidence was to show corrr:on 
pl~n, absence of mistake, motive, onportunitv and ir~ent, 
bnt not to prove the guilt o.:: anv other offense (P. 153). 
Moreover, as this C:ourt notej in State v. rar:c, 
17 Utah 2cl 90, 94, 404 P.2d 677, f.7° (1965): 
. it can be safelv assumed 
that the trial court will be so~ewhat rnore 
~~re discriminating in annraising both 
the competency and the effect pronerlv 
to be given evidence. The rulinos on 
evidence are looY:ed u:Jccr, with a greater 
degree of indulgence when the trial 
is to the court than when it is to 
the jury." 
This position has been reaffirmed in several cases: Sta~ 
v. Burke, 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 55n (1942); and State v. 
c'.eac:mr::, 23 TJtah 2d 12, 45;:; P.2d '56 (19i-'::'). 
The Court was aware of Rul2 45 and after 
consideration of its provisions, the Court snecifically 
ruled that "receipt of such evidence did not create a 
substantial danger o[ unClue prejudice or of confusion or 
possihility of l'lislca<.ling the trir:-r of fact" (R. 150) · 
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,Jic~:-_;-,JI<' ] 2 Ut;,ll 2c:J 8, 361 P. 2cJ. ill2 (1953), Ci.tee) in 
In that case, which involvr~C'_ the robl:;e;:-v 
of a s~lt Lake City m0rket, this court held that it was 
error ~or the trial court to have admitted evidence of a 
Texas robbery where the defendant had been charged as an 
accessory. The nrosecution offered such evidence to show 
modus operanai, however, the only similarity shown was that 
two ren were involved in both incidents. The court said 
that in the absence of any greater sinilarity between the two 
situations, evidence of the Texas incident should have been 
excluriE"d since its only effect was to inply t!1at the defendant 
was a nerson of evil character. This court also stated 
that the Texas incident wo~ld have been properly admitted if 
it had had "st)ecial relevancy to prove the crime of which the 
defendant stands charged". 
Admission of evidence of other crimes conducted by 
the apµellant is relevant to prove the burglary with which he 
was ch::i.rgecl. Testimony that there \·1ere two sets of fresr, 
footprints around each cabin at Pines Ranch, that the cabins 
ha.d been entered unlawfully, and that miscellaneous items 
inside had been moved near the door shows that the appellant 
intenae~ to take these items from the cabins. 
-11-
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in Lit:encJ.r2ti.on o~: th·? theft. 
that th~re be a similarity between the offense c~~r0cd a~ 
the evidence cf other crirnindl con~Jct. 
State 
(1972), a case dealinc; 1,;ith an tE1l-:\'-,£ul sale' of w!r.ijuana, 
is also consiste:-it \vith the cas'" r;_:-,:>sentlv !:•r,":orc' this Co~r· 
This Court in Kc.sa.i upheld the t:cic::'.. Court's -:i.dr::ission re-
This Court s1ia: 
''I',ri(!ence of othc:- c~i_r,es is nnt 
:-.· 1 1·-issi~le if the ··')~1~~.,-:,-:i:= is to dis-
grace the defenda:-it as a oerson c~ 
evil character with a nronensity to 
corr"-rii t er il"le 2.nd thus l i 1·cc l ., to hav ,' 
com!'.litted the crirr~c· chCTrged. I~o~:/0.,;er, 
relevant evidence is ad~issible Eor 
the puraose of exalaining the cir-
curnstal'.ces surrounding the cr:i.Pie 
of which the defendant stands accu~cd; 
an0 ti;.-: fa.ct t':'iat it -,dv t<::'nd "::o 
cri~e ~ill net ren~ec ~':'ie evidence 
incoPneten t. " 
cabins on UoveTnhcr 22, 1977 anll rno\red :1nrri1 .. ~rCJL..'.S j t. 1-=:1;:s insdc 
.. 1 ~-
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:_ '. )() ~ 
the Lural~c~ of th~ Cornwall Cabin. 
'I'h5 s evidence would lil:e\,rise have been adl'lissab~_r:; 
under s;-,'te v. l'ci>::r~es, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950), 
where t~is Court ~tated: 
the state was not 
see~·-inc_i to introduce evidence of 
separate and distinct offenses, 
it was seeking to cornolete the 
forra and structure of the scheme 
unclr:r r,fnich the c3.2f:;0(-3.nt \·las 
allegeJ to have been oneratinn 
and the evidence which-was in: 
traduced was adMissible for such 
purpose. All of it was relevant 
and tended to convict the defendant 
of the crine for which he was being 
tried." (ci.t 618). 
The evidence claimed by annellant to be erronecu~ly 
ac1mittec1 ':1as not ail'Tlitted for the purrose of demonstratinS" 
the anpellant's bacl char~cter, but, was ac'mitted for the 
ch2 cr~~e in order to show intent, absence of nistake, 
motive, onoortunity, and a com.~on plan. These are ligitimate 
reasons for the introduction of the evidence and the fact 
that the evidence tends to show that the appellant had 
COmI,1i +:to•_' othc_'r c 1- iric-,s doe? not render the evidence incompetent. 
-13-
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the Motion to Strik~. 
For these re;:_scns, th~ rcsponcJent urc!;;s tb.c Court 
to affirn the judg::ient of" the T,m-.er Court. 
Resnectfully sub~ittcJ, 
>\OBERT B. l!!'..tJS!.U 
r,,.ttorney Generrtl 
f:'l.ln "'. 001".IUS 
1'.ssistant l\ttorney Ger.cral 
-].cl-
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